This paper investigates the relative importance of two proxies for shareholder influence over the board: the size of equity ownership and Banzhaf index voting power. Our empirical findings indicate that consideration of voting power in models may result in conclusions different from those that consider the size of equity ownership, on payout policy if firms are either paying dividends or repurchasing shares, or both. Comparing to the size of equity ownership, empirical results by the proxy of voting power are more consistent with theoretical predictions.
Introduction
A firm"s payout policy refers to the financial decisions the firm makes about whether to pay shareholders dividends, how large these dividends should be, and how frequently and in what form dividends should be distributed. Large shareholders, as Shleifer and Vishny (1986) point out, may potentially accumulate sufficient controlling rights to influence dividend payout decisions by influencing the composition of the firm"s board of directors who, according to Brealey and Myers (2003) , are basically responsible for such decisions. For this reason, the interests of such large shareholders may steer a firm"s dividend policy.
This paper extends the analysis of the impact made by large shareholders on dividend payout policy. In particular, responding to the problem of measuring shareholder influence by the size of ownership in prior research, we advocate the use of a shareholder voting power index derived from the theory of cooperative games to analyze this corporate policy choice. The Banzhaf index was introduced for the purpose of analyzing block voting systems: the probability that a citizen's vote will change the block's "decision", and the probability that the block's votes will change the outcome of the election. This index has been popularly adopted in recent empirical studies to examine the shareholder voting power system in the U.K., Spain, and France (Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2005; Leech, 2001 ; Leech and Manjon, 2003; Bloch and Kremp, 1999) . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to apply the game theory-based index to corporate payout policies in the U.S.
In addition, we adopt a "cleaned" dataset of large shareholders in publicly traded corporations in the U.S (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) .
As documented in Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers and Metrick (2006) , despite the common use of large shareholder data in financial studies, there is no clean off-the-shelf database available to facilitate research. Dlugosz et al (2006) reveal that even the currently and most widely used ownership database, the Compact Disclosure (CD) of Standard & Poor"s, has mistakes and biases such as overlaps and erroneous consideration of preferred stocks. Therefore, Dlugosz et al (2006) review original proxy statements for the largest 1,500 U.S. companies, propose a consistent set of solutions to fix these problems and finally provide a "clean" database freely accessible to all researchers. 1 We find that there are about 2 to 3 blockholders per firm (2.71) in the U.S. Some firms have more blockholders than others (e.g., 11 blockholders of General Semiconductor Corporation in year 1998). And some companies have only one blockholder, like Oracle 1996-1999, and Microsoft 2000-2001. Apparently, when firms get bigger, it is harder to accumulate more than 5% of total shares and to be a blockholder. While in UK, as reported by Renneboog and Trojanowski, (2005) , the blockholders possess 37.01% of the total shares outstanding. For our sample, the blockholders hold 27.44% of the total shares outstanding in sum. But, in some firms, about 10% of our sample, the blockholders" equity ownership is as high as 50%. The voting powers distributed among the top three shareholders in the U.S. are 0.74, 0.11, and 0.10. These values are comparable with the Banzhaf indices of the largest three shareholders for British firms (1992-1998), 0.65, 0.14, and 0.13 2 . To prove that the shareholder power index is a more significant measure for the shareholder influence over the board, we reclassify the blockholders of Dlugosz et al (2006) and focus on two groups: managerial shareholders and tax-exempt shareholders. According to dividend clientele theory, shareholders select their holdings of stocks according to their tax preferences for dividends. Investors in high income tax brackets are likely to invest in low-dividend stocks and investors with low tax rates in high-dividend stocks. Therefore, firms may pay cash dividends to attract less-taxed institutions and may adopt other forms of value distributions like stock repurchase to compensate high-taxed individuals. 3 While the issue of shareholder preference between stocks repurchase and dividend payouts have been previously investigated, most researchers (Hsieh and Wang, 2008; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Jiraporn, 2006; and Moser, 2007) have only considered the size of equity ownership as a proxy for shareholder influence and their empirical tests provided mixed findings. This paper adopts both proxies, voting power and size of ownership, and tests the influence of managerial shareholders and tax-exempt institutional shareholders to corporate payout policy.
Our empirical findings include that for firms that pay dividends but do not repurchase shares, if the officers are the largest shareholders, they prefer to distribute more dividends. When both choices of paying dividends and repurchasing shares become available, officer shareholders prefer share repurchases to dividends. The model with Banzhaf index voting power provides evidence aligned with theoretical directions more significantly than the model with equity ownership. Secondly, if the largest shareholder is tax-exempt institutions, they prefer distribute more dividends when Banzhaf index voting power is used, whereas the results would be different 2 See Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) for more details. 3 Since 2003, the U.S. has implemented the new law of dividend tax, under which qualified dividends are taxed at the same rate as long-term capital gains, which is 15 percent for most individual investors. In May 2003, the dividend tax rate for retail investors fell dramatically. The top statutory tax rate on dividend income dropped from more than 38% to 15% and the top rate on capital gains declined from 20% to 15%. when equity ownership is used to measure shareholder influence.
The rest of the paper is divided into a discussion of the literature (Section 2), the methodology (Section 3), data (section 4), empirical results (section 5) and the conclusion (Section 6).
Literature Review
In a world without market imperfections, dividend policy is irrelevant as far as the value of a firm is concerned. It does not make any difference how the firm"s profit is distributed, either paid to the owners or retained in the business for reinvestment (Miller and Modigliani, 1961) . Various theories have proposed some factors for the fact that many firms pay dividends. Agency theory of dividend policy claims that dividend payments act to reduce agency costs between managers and shareholders by forcing the firm to pay excess profit. By doing this, managers are prevented from consuming the excess profits as perquisites or wasting them on unwise projects (Jensen, 1986) . For future additional funding, managers are forced to access external capital markets and thereby allow it to closely monitor the firm"s management and agency issues (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984) . Alternatively signaling theory of dividend policy, suggests that managers use dividend payments to convey information to investors about the firm"s expected earnings (Bhattacharya, 1979 (Bhattacharya, , 1980 Miller and Rock, 1985) .
Due to information asymmetry, shareholders do not have access to a complete set of information about a firm"s expected cash flows. Therefore, the firm"s managers, as insiders, would like to establish credible signals conveying their firm"s prospects to the shareholders. Dividend payout becomes one of the most efficient signals, as it is costly and poor performers cannot simply follow.
If firms choose to pay out to shareholders, firms have the choice between dividends and share repurchase as medium of compensating shareholders. In perfect market conditions without taxes and transaction costs, the choice between dividends and share repurchase may be irrelevant. However, if dividends and capital gains are taxed at different rates, as is the case in the United States, the choice becomes important, and shareholders and firms may prefer one form of compensation to another. Dividend clientele theory suggests that shareholders select their holdings of stocks according to their tax preferences for dividends. Investors in high income tax brackets would like to purchase stocks with low dividends, while investors with low tax rates would like to choose high-dividend stocks. Therefore, firms pay dividends to attract less-taxed institutions and may adopt other forms of value distributions like stock repurchase to attract high-taxed individuals. This view has been the basis of several research articles, some of which are hereby discussed.
Managerial shareholders and payout policy
Jensen, Solberg, and Zorn (1992), and Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) find managerial stock ownership has a negative impact on dividend levels. As Easterbrook (1984) and Rozeff (1982) suggested, managerial shareholders provide direct incentive alignment, and thus higher managerial ownership reduces the need to pay costly dividends as a control of agency problems. However, Hsieh and Wang (2008) argue that tax considerations may be the more significant reason for this negative relation between managerial shareholders and dividend levels, as the managerial shareholders have high marginal tax rates. Hsieh and Wang (2008) , while investigating the payout policy of US firms for the period between 1991 and 2001, finds that firms with a higher level of managerial ownership prefer share repurchase as the method of compensating shareholders. They find this to be especially true during years when repurchase has a tax advantage, when compared to dividends. Moser (2007) also concludes that due to the increase in managerial ownership and the addition of dividend tax penalty, firms are more likely to compensate shareholders through share repurchases than dividends. Providing international evidence, Farinha (2002) does a crosssectional investigation of about 600 UK firms and finds that ownership affects dividend policy especially if managerial entrenchment is taken into perspective.
Institutional shareholders and payout policy
Existing evidence is mixed about the influences the institutional shareholder has over payout policies. In the US, dividends are traditionally taxed as ordinary income for individual investors, while institutions receive certain tax deduction for dividend income to avoid double taxation. Moh"d, Perry, and Rimbey (1995) Grinstein and Michaely (2005) reports that institutional ownership does not lead to an increase in dividends as previously thought. Alternatively, they find that institutions prefer firms that pay dividends to those that do not, but between firms that pay dividends, the preference is for firms paying fewer dividends.
In spite of the higher tax rate, dividends continue to be a substantial source of income distributed to shareholders. For example, according to Allen and Michaely (1995) 
Methodology
Although shareholder influence is crucial to the analysis of such financial decisions, the actual level and measurement of shareholder influence over board decisions is barely available publicly. In prior literature, the size of stocks controlled by shareholders is often included in empirical models for the analysis of shareholder control. However, the size of stock holdings is only a crude proxy. The main problem is that it ignores how stocks are distributed among other shareholders. For instance, a block representing 10% of shares in a firm which has a widely dispersed ownership structure might obtain dominant control, while a block of 15% in a firm which has less dispersed ownership distribution may not give its holder significant power. A block of even 5% ownership may become important to the system of corporate governance in countries without large concentrations of share ownership as is the case with most corporations in the U.S.
As we know, shareholders make collective decisions by voting. Normally, votes are granted to shareholders based upon the size of their shareholdings, and one share represents one vote. It is necessary to make a strong distinction between a shareholder"s voting weight, which represents the size of their shareholding, and voting power, which represents their ability to change or the probability of changing the outcome of a decision with their vote. Assuming a firm follows a simple majority-vote rule, that is, any proposal will be approved if the votes cast by shareholders are over 50 percent, and, for simplicity, assuming there are only three shareholders in this firm and they hold 48, 48, and 4 votes, the voting weights of these shareholders are 48, 48 and 4 percent respectively. Each shareholder has an equal chance to change the voting outcome because each shareholder wins the voting only if at least one of the other two shareholders casts votes in the same way. Thus, the normalized voting powers, or the probability of swings, for each of these shareholders are equally 1/3 4 . This demonstrates that it is the relative rather than the absolute influence power of a given shareholder that determines his/her ability to influence the firm"s policies (Crespi and Renneboog, 2003) . Therefore, we use the Banzhaf index derived from the co-operative game theory to represent the ability of large shareholders to influence the voting outcome of payout policy.
Measuring Shareholder Power
The Banzhaf Power Index was introduced for the purpose of analyzing block voting systems: the probability that a citizen's vote will change the block's "decision," and the probability that the block's votes will change the outcome of the election (Banzhaf, 1965) . To understand Banzhaf index consider a jointstock company with n shareholders 5 . Let w 1 , w 2 ,…w n , 4 Although this is a rather simplistic example, Leech (2001) provides a similar example in addition to a detailed discussion. In fact Leech (2001) shows that although a 20% shareholding can provide effective working control, the top six shareholders can form a large enough voting power bloc to control a firm, even if they did not have the majority of shares. 5 Leech and Manjón (2003) also provide a discussion on the Banzhaf index. They also investigate the appropriateness of the power index approach to estimate voting power and find the Banzhaf index, which we use in this power to be a suitable approach in inferring control. They also show that if voting power is considered, minority ownership can be effective and also common. This is perhaps another reason to consider the relative importance of size of ownership and voting power in influencing payout decisions.
such that 0< w i <0.5, denote individual voting weights. The weights are in decreasing order of size, such that w i ≥ w i+1 . The largest shareholder, whose size is w 1 , assumes that all the other shareholders vote arbitrarily, apathetically, and autonomously, and with a probability of 0. . A unique decision is made if q ≥ 0.5 in case of a simple majority. α ranges from 0.5 and 1, while its cumulative normal probability is the degree of control.
By considering coalitions of shareholders, power indices are estimated such that the total combined voting weight of all the players in a coalition T is w(T) where
Where w(T) ≥ q for a winning coalition, while for the losing coalition it is w(T) < q. Swings i.e., losing coalitions becoming wining coalitions if a shareholder i joins the coalition thus defining the power indices, such that a swing is a losing coalition T if q -w i < w(T) < q.
The Banzhaf index is based on the idea of counting swings and the swings are counted with each coalition given the same weight regardless of its size. In this situation, the probability of random coalition formation is 2 1-n , while the probability of a swing shareholder is
Equation (4) represents the non-normalized form of Banzhaf index. Normalizing it produces an index that gives the distribution of power among shareholders. The normalized Banzhaf index is represented as
The Banzhaf index was introduced for the purpose of analyzing block voting systems: the probability that a citizen's vote will change the block's "decision", and the probability that the block's votes will change the outcome of the election. Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) point out that this mechanism captures the power to influence policy and it would be the appropriate instrument for measuring shareholder voting power, since payout choices, by their nature, are policy issues. This index has been popularly adopted in recent empirical studies to examine the shareholder voting power system in the U.K., Spain, and France (Leech, 2001 ; Leech and Manjon, 2003; Bloch and Kremp, 1999) . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to apply the game theory-based index to corporate payout policies in the U.S.
Dividend Model Specification
We investigate the relationship between shareholder influence and payout policy by the Partial Adjustment Model (Lintner, 1956 ). The Partial Adjustment Model (PAM) assumes that the target dividend D * of a firm, for any given year t, is related to the earnings at t, through a desired payout ratio (r), then
Considering that the firm, in year t, aims to adjust its dividend (
The resistance of managers to change dividends is represented by the constant a , while the coefficient c represents the speed of adjustment to the new target. Substituting (6) to (7) yields the partial adjustment model (PAM):
In order to investigate the link between shareholder power and dividend policy, these models are modified by including interactions of the shareholder variables (e.g., Banzhaf index and size of equity for the largest shareholder). Now assuming that payouts of firms would be influenced by large shareholders, and then adjusting the models above for such influences results in the following models:
In these equations, D is payouts either through cash dividend or stock repurchases. If large shareholders prefer payouts (either cash or stock repurchase), the coefficient of E i,t *Ownership or E i,t *VotingPower, will be significantly positive.
Apart from these variables we also consider dummy variables to control for industry, calendar, and investigate the influence of firm size, leverage and Tobin"s Q. Adding variables for firm size (S), leverage (Lev), Tobin"s Q (TQ), and the dummy variables for industry and calendar effects, and representing equations 9 and 10 in regression framework results in the following equations:
Ownership α These models are applied to firms that may be only dividend paying, only repurchasing shares, or doing both, where the largest shareholder is firm officer or tax-exempt institution.
Data
We start with a sample from Dlugosz et al. (2006) who collected data from original proxy statements for the largest 1,500 U.S. companies from 1996 to 2001. The SEC requires that proxy statements list all investors owning more than 5% of a company"s common stock. The data in the sample includes company name, large shareholders, industry, size of ownership, and shareholder identity (officer, director, or outsider). After merging the initial sample with COMPUSTAT to extract variables such as total assets, sales, liabilities, dividends and stock repurchase, we obtain 5,495 firm-years for 1,494 unique firms, and 4,792 firm-years with positive earnings, covering 1,326 unique firms 6 . Table 1 summarizes the sample characteristics. The average book value (total assets) is $ 7.57 billion. The average earnings, basically the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), are $ 467.88 million. Shareholders (common and preferred shareholders) are paid $ 66.65 million in dividends and $ 94.70 million in repurchases on average from 1996 to 2001. The average Tobin"s Q and the average leverage of the sample firms are 2.14 and 46% respectively. For firmyears with positive earnings, as also shown in Table 1 , more cash dividends ($71.71 million) and stock repurchase ($101.67 million) are distributed. Dividends are equal to the sum of dividends to common shares and preferred shares. Earnings are defined as the earnings before interest and taxes in a particular year. The market value of the firm is computed as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of total debt at the end of a given year. Book value of the firm is defined as the book value of the total assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to the book value of the total assets. Tobin's Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the book value of the total assets. average earnings payout for the sample period. N is the number of firms and the payout is a fraction with respect to Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) for the six year sample period. Panel A contain firms that have dividend payments only, while Panel B firms are only involved in repurchase. Panel C firms pay dividends and also repurchase shares. In our sample, we consider only firms that have with positive EBIT. In this study, firms consider separately firms that pay dividends only, do repurchase only from firms that pay dividends and repurchase shares as well. Table 2 Table 2 , it is clear that over the years, repurchase of shares rather than dividends are preferred by firms as a mode of compensating shareholders. The preference is witnessed in both the number of firms as well as the payout ratios, with the exception of the year 2001, as there are more firms paying dividends than firms engaged in share repurchase.
Looking at the total number of firms involved in both dividends and repurchase, it steadily increases from 255 in 1996, to 368 in 2000 only to decrease to 293 in 2001. The total payout increases as well from 49.71% in 1996 to 102.97% in 2001. The average payout through share repurchases also witnesses an increase over the sample period. Table 3 provides the distribution of blockholders, the size of their equity ownership, and their Banzhaf index voting power computed by the methods described in section 3.1. On average, there are about 2 to 3 blockholders per firm (2.71). As shown in Panel A of Table 3 , the firm size is negatively associated with the number of blocks and blockholder ownership. On average, the blockholders of a firm hold 27.44% of the total shares outstanding in sum. But, in some firms, about 10% of our sample, the blockholders" equity ownership is as high as 50%.
Panel B presents the size of stock holdings and the Banzhaf voting power of the top 3 largest shareholders, as well as their identity. In Dlugosz et al. (2006) , block shareholders are classified into five categories, which are (1) officer blockholders; (2) non-officer director blockholders; (3) affiliated blockholders, either individuals or trusts, who are likely influenced by another officer or director; (4) ESOPs (Employee Share Ownership Plans) related blockholders; and (5) outside blockholders. We reclassify the blockholders into institutions and individuals, with two further subgroups in each category, officer blockholders and tax-exempt institutions.
As shown in Panel B of Table 3 , the largest, 2 nd largest, and 3 rd largest shareholders hold 14.58%, 6.57%, and 3.41% of the outstanding stock. In Panel B, we also report the identities of the largest shareholder.
As shown, most of the largest shareholders are institutions (4,148) within which 348 are tax-exempt institutions. These institutions include pension funds, college endowment funds and nonprofit organizations. There are 1,149 individual investors who are the largest shareholders in a firm. Among them, 582 are officers of the same firm. These officers may accumulate large shareholdings through employee compensation stock option plans.
As suggested by Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) , we consider a one-stage voting game, where each large shareholder is treated as a separate player and we compute the corresponding Banzhaf index.
The empirical results in Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) reject the hypothesis that large shareholders form a coalition and that the coalition"s votes will change the outcome. They suggest that, rather than forming type-based coalitions and participating in the voting game, large shareholders may achieve their payout policy goals in their own interest. As shown in Panel B, the voting powers distributed among the top three shareholders are 0.74, 0.11, and 0.10. For an international comparison, these values are comparable with the Banzhaf indices of the largest three shareholders for British firms (1992-1998), 0.65, 0.14, and 0.13. Considering the dominant power controlled by the largest shareholder in our sample (Banzhaf index=0 .74), we focus our remaining analysis on the impact of a firm"s largest shareholder on its payout policy. Table 4 provides the regression results for our equations 11 and 12, specifically examining the influences of officer shareholders on cash dividend and share repurchase dynamics. The influences of officer shareholders over the board are measured by interactive variables, E i,t *Ownership and E i,t *VotingPower. Recall that both agency theory and dividend clientele theory predict a negative relation between officer shareholder and cash dividends but a positive relation between officer shareholder and stock purchase. The firms included -while carrying out the regressions in Table 4 -are paying dividends or repurchasing shares, but not both. 
Empirical results

Managerial shareholders and payout policy
This table summarizes the regression results for Equations 11 and 12 for firms either paying dividends or repurchasing shares only. This table considers the size of equity ownership or the voting power of only the large officer shareholders. The dependent variable (D t -D t-1 ) or (R t -R t-1 ) is the difference in dividend or repurchase payout. Highlighted coefficients are significant a 1%, while superscripts a and b represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. The voting (Voting Power) is measured by the normalized Banzhaf index:
. Ownership is the size of equity ownership. S i,t =log(Assets). Lev i,t =Total Debt/ Assets. TQ i,t = (Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Debt) / (Assets). Di,t-1=Dividend or repurchase payout in year t-1. Ei,t= Earnings Before Interest and Taxes in year t-1.
First, several findings about control factors are consistent when using proxies of equity ownership and voting power. Shown in Table 4 , leverage (Lev i,t ) and Tobin"s Q (TQ i,t ) play a significant role in repurchase dynamics irrespective of whether equity ownership or voting power is placed in the model. The positive coefficients indicate that larger firms and firms with more growth opportunities are more likely to buy back their shares. Firm size (S i,t ) plays an insignificant role in repurchase dynamics but plays a significant role in influencing dividend dynamics.
From Table 4 , we can also see that an increase in earnings (E i,t ) leads to an increase in repurchase of shares but a decrease in dividend payments. Lagged dividends (D i,t-1 ,dividend) have positive coefficients and lagged share repurchase (D i,t-1 ,repurchase) has negative coefficients. As we know, cash dividend payments provide a more stable financial compensation to shareholders and usually follow regular patterns, while repurchase, as a relatively unstable compensation form, would not be undertaken continuously. Thus a large repurchase in a previous year does not lead to an increase in repurchase for the following year. Instead, skipping dividends or dividend cancellation usually generates great shock to investors, which are typically viewed as a bad signal of poor firm performance. Therefore if cash dividends were paid out previously, another had better follow with a greater amount.
Next, the variable of voting power interacted with earnings (E it *Voting power) measures the influence of the largest shareholder, who also works for the invested firm, Table 4 reports that the coefficient of E it *Voting power is significantly positive for dividend payouts. That is, an increase in the voting power leads to an increase in dividend payout. The impact of size of equity ownership on dividend payments (E it *Ownership), however, is insignificant. Both the impact of size of equity ownership and voting power on repurchase dynamics, is also insignificant. Industry and year effects are not significant for dividend and repurchase, irrespective of equity ownership or voting power as a measure of shareholder influence. 
This table summarizes the regression results for Equations 11 and 12 for firms they both pay dividends and repurchase shares. This table considers the size of equity ownership or the voting power of only the large officer shareholders. The dependent variable (D t -D t-1 ) or (R t -R t-1 ) is the difference in dividend or repurchase payout. Highlighted coefficients are significant a 1%, while superscripts a and b represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively.
While carrying out the regressions of Table 5 , only those firms that engage in both dividend payouts and repurchase shares are included. For such firms, leverage does not have a significant impact on payout policy. Both firm size has some influence over dividend dynamics, and Tobin"s Q has some influence over repurchase dynamics. Larger firms are likely to increase cash dividends but are less likely to increase share repurchase activity if Tobin"s Q increases.
As far as the impact of shareholder control on dividend dynamics (E i,t *Ownership and E i,t *VotingPower) is concerned, equity ownership has an insignificant coefficient, while voting power is significant (coefficient= -0.02) in the model. As far as the impact of shareholder control on repurchase dynamics (E i,t *Ownership and E i,t *VotingPower) is concerned, both equity ownership (coefficient= 0.03) and voting power (coefficient= 0.75) have positive significant coefficients.
Combined with the results of Tables 4 and 5 , our findings conclude that for firms that pay dividends but do not repurchase shares, if the officers are the largest shareholders, they prefer to distribute more dividends.
When both choices of paying dividends and repurchasing shares become available, officer shareholders prefer share repurchases to dividends. The model (equation 12) with Banzhaf index voting power provides evidence more aligned with theoretical directions than the model (equation 11) with equity ownership. 
This table summarizes the regression results for Equations 11 and 12 for firms either paying dividends or repurchasing shares only. This table considers the size of equity ownership or the voting power of only the large tax-exempt shareholders. The dependent variable (D t -D t-1 ) or (R t -R t-1 ) is the difference in dividend or repurchase payout. Highlighted coefficients are significant a 1%, while superscripts a and b represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. Tables 6 and 7 provide the results of the regression that studies the impact of tax-exempt institutional shareholders. While Table 6 considers firms that pay dividends or repurchase shares, Table 7 considers only those firms that compensate shareholders through both dividends and repurchase of shares.
Institutional shareholders and payout policy
As in the U.S. the tax treatment of dividends varies widely depending upon the identity of the institutions, there is no consistent answer in current literature to conclude the influences of institutional shareholder over payout policy. Instead of grouping the institutions all together, we focus on the taxexempt institutions. Our purpose is to evaluate the power of two proxies for shareholder influence, Banzhaf index and equity ownership. To be a good proxy, the interactive variables, E i,t *Ownership or E i,t *VotingPower, should be significantly positive for cash dividends and significantly negative for stock repurchase.
From Table 6 , we observe once the impact of tax-exempt shareholder (E i,t *Ownership, or E i,t *VotingPower) is introduced to dividend dynamics and repurchase dynamics, size becomes a significant determinant. Tobin"Q is significant and positive to repurchase dynamics. Earnings have positive coefficients, and lagged dividends or lagged repurchase have negative coefficients. Thus, as earnings increase, cash dividends and stock repurchase increase, but a large cash dividends and stock repurchase in previous year may lead to a decrease in the current year.
For firms with cash dividends only, E i,t *Ownership is significant and negative, while E i,t *VotingPower is significant and positive. For firms with stock repurchase only, both E i,t *Ownership and E i,t *VotingPower are insignificant. Thus, the influence of tax-exempt institutional shareholder over payout policy, measured by E i,t *Ownership, is contradict to the predications, whereas E i,t *VotingPower provide the evidence that tax-exempt institutions prefer distributing cash dividends. 
This table summarizes the regression results for Equations 11 and 12 for firms they both pay dividends and repurchase shares. This table considers the size of equity ownership or the voting power of only the large taxexempt shareholders. The dependent variable (D t -D t-1 ) or (R t -R t-1 ) is the difference in dividend or repurchase payout. Highlighted coefficients are significant a 1%, while superscripts a and b represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively.
For firms with both cash dividends and stock repurchase, shown in Table 7 , for dividend dynamics, E i,t *Ownership is significantly negative and E i,t *VotingPower is significantly positive. For stock repurchase dynamics, E i,t *Ownership is insignificant but E i,t *VotingPower is positively significant.
The results of Tables 6 and 7 indicate that for firms that pay dividends but don"t repurchase shares, if the largest shareholder is tax-exempt institutions, they prefer distribute more dividends when Banzhaf index voting power is used, whereas when equity ownership is used to measure shareholder influence, the results would be different. Thus, the model (equation 12) with Banzhaf index voting power provides the evidence more aligned with theoretical directions than the model (equation 11) with equity ownership.
In Table 7 , while lagged dividends are significantly positive in the dividend dynamics, lagged repurchase is significantly negative in the repurchase dynamics. The industry and the year to year dummies do not have an impact on the dividend dynamics of firms that compensate shareholders through both dividends and share repurchase. But, the year to year dummies are significant variables to the repurchase dynamics, indicating that repurchase activities are timed to market and may be driven by changes in business cycles.
Conclusions
Although a plethora of articles have investigated issues related to dividend policy, ranging from its irrelevance (Miller and Modigliani, 1961) to the choice between the method of compensation (Allen, Bernardo and Welch, 2000) , relatively few papers have investigated the impact of shareholder structure in determining the choices of payout policy (e.g., Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990 (1996) finds ownership of tax-exempt institutions exhibiting no preferences for either high dividend yield or low yield stocks.
As the equity ownership represents a shareholder"s voting weight, the size of their shareholding, it ignores how stocks are distributed among other shareholders. This current paper thus contributes to finance literature by evaluating an alternative proxy for shareholder influence, Banzhaf index voting power, and investigating whether large shareholders affect payout policy through their influence over the board. Leech (2001) lays down the foundation for considering Banzhaf index voting power as factor affecting working control of as a corporation. Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) incorporated the voting power index to investigate preferences for compensation method in UK. The Banzhaf index was introduced for the purpose of analyzing block voting systems: the probability that a citizen's vote will change the block's "decision," and the probability that the block's votes will change the outcome of the election. Following Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) , we use a one-stage voting game, where each large shareholder is treated as a separate player and compute the corresponding Banzhaf index, the probability that a player"s vote will change the board"s decisions about payout policy.
In the U.S. the tax treatment of dividends varies widely depending upon the identity of shareholders; there is no consistent answer in current literature to conclude the influences of shareholders over payout policy. We classify large shareholders into individuals and institutions, as dividends are traditionally taxed as ordinary income for individual investors, while institutions receive certain tax deduction for dividend income to avoid double taxation. For example, dividends received by corporations have a minimum 70% exclusion from taxable income, and tax-exempt institutions are not taxed at all. Such a differential tax treatment of dividends has led to our hypothesis that managerial shareholders prefer stock repurchase to cash dividend, and tax-exempt shareholders may prefer cash dividends over repurchase.
Thus, the questions arises whether the size of the equity ownership or Banzhaf index voting power are good proxies for shareholders influence? Besides is there any distinct preference for share repurchase or dividends, for firms that pay dividends or stock repurchase only, or both. This paper contributes to the literature by investigating these issues.
Our findings indicate that the size of equity ownership of large officer shareholder do not influence the dividend payouts or repurchase activity, if firms are compensating shareholders through either dividends or repurchase. Voting power of such shareholders, however, influences dividend decisions but does not influence repurchase activities. For firms that compensate shareholders through both repurchase and dividends, the variables of Banzhaf index voting power are significant (negative for dividends and positive for stock repurchase), implying that officer shareholders prefer share repurchases to dividends. Large tax-exempt shareholders, however, prefer to use their voting power to increase both dividend payments and stock repurchase. Thus, by summarizing the results, it can be stated that the size of ownership or voting power influences payout decisions differently, and their impact may depends upon whether firms pay only dividends, does only repurchase, or does both.
